The European Union (EU) is once again at a crossroads, hesitating over the terms of a new constitutional compromise. To build an integrated continental market the Member States sacrificed some of their power to veto Union regulation. In return they got assurance that the regulatory choices submitted for their final approval would be shaped by a publicregarding process that filtered out proposals chiefly motivated by narrow self-interest. The 'classic' Community Method of EU policy-making, based on the agenda-setting role of the Commission legislative initiative, provided that assurance. This compromise transformed the EU from an association of states into a single legal community whose integrity was ensured by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Until now this community has worked well enough to assuage many of the most pressing concerns about its democratic legitimacy.
The potential new compromise regards 'Social Europe'. Faced with the urgent, politically imperative task of reconstructing, separately but harmoniously, their welfare states, the Member States would relax the power accorded them by the treaties and the Community Method to block EU intrusion into national systems of social protection. Again they would insist on institutionalization of a public-regarding process of agenda setting. This time that process would be embodied in new forms of experimentalist governance, epitomized by but not confined to the Open Method (p. 214 ) of Coordination (OMC). 1 These permit exploratory learning within and among Member States by contrasting different problem-solving strategies, each informed by a particular idea of the good, with the aim of both improving local performance and creating frameworks for joint action at the Union level. Through the ramifications of experimental governance, this compromise could transform EU policy-making again, integrating it more fully into civil society. At the limit the compromise would help establish the EU as a new form of pragmatist democracy that sees problem solving and agonistic deliberation over ideals of the good as so indissolubly connected that effective learning becomes institutionalized in the continuing exploration of deep values.
The roots of this potential compromise are political and intellectual as well as administrative. Foremost among these has been the progressive shift in both national and EU debates away from the goal of a single Social Europe as a regulatory counterbalance to the single market in favour of an alternative approach based on connecting welfare diversity within the European Social Model through policy coordination and mutual learning. 2 This shift in the debate reflects in turn a number of surprising empirical findings and novel conceptual developments. One is the limited incidence of social dumping or regulatory races to the bottom, coupled with evidence of races to the top in some well-documented cases, which has made the EU appear less constitutionally hostile to market-correcting regulation than originally feared. 3 A second is the discovery that there is not one welfare state in Europe, but several welfare-state families: what Anton Hemerijck and Jos Berghman, following Fritz Scharpf, term 'legitimate diversity'. 4 Whatever their (p. 215 ) families have been struggling with similar challenges of adapting inherited institutions and programmes to changing employment patterns, household and family structures, demographic trends, and distributions of social risksome countries more successfully than others. These same developments suggest that Europe might serve in a new way to enhance social protection in a period of increasing uncertainty by creating a forum for discussing and generalizing the results of the different national strategies of adjustment. 5 
The Open Method of Coordination: Theoretical Promise of a New Mode of EU Governance
This is where the new governance comes in, above all the Open Method of Coordination. The OMC may be defined as an experimentalist approach to EU governance based on iterative benchmarking of national progress towards common European objectives and organized mutual learning. 6 Since its announcement as a new and broadly applicable governance instrument at the extraordinary Lisbon European socio-economic summit in March 2000, which drew on experience with the coordination of national economic and especially employment policies over the preceding decade, the OMC has been extended to cover an enormous range of policy fields. Beyond the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) , and the European Employment Strategy (EES) inaugurated by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) , the OMC has become the central tool of EU social policy-making in the new millennium, with formal coordination processes launched for social inclusion and pensions over the period 2001 to 2003, (p. 216 ) and further proposals pending from the Commission and the Parliament for the application of this method to health and long-term care. As part of the 'Lisbon Strategy' aimed at turning the EU by 2010 into 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion', the March 2000 European Council authorized the extension of the OMC to a host of other policy areas, such as research/innovation, information society/eEurope, enterprise promotion, structural economic reform, and education and training. Since then, OMC-type processes and approaches have also been proposed by the Commission and other European bodies as mechanisms for monitoring and supplementing existing EU legislative instruments and authority in fields such as immigration and asylum, environmental protection, disability, occupational health and safety, and even fundamental rights, as well as in areas like youth policy where the Union has few if any legal powers. 7 In addition, following recommendations from the Commission Group on Industrial Relations, the European social partner organizations have drawn inspiration from the OMC for the monitoring and follow-up of (p. 217 ) non-binding framework agreements and guidelines at both cross-industry and sectoral levels. 8 The OMC was defined by the Portuguese Presidency at Lisbon and afterwards in terms closely modeled on the EES as involving a specific ensemble of elements:
• 'Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long term; Abstracting from such procedural variations, the OMC has been widely acclaimed as a theoretically promising governance instrument for EU policymaking in a number of crucial respects. As many commentators have emphasized, the OMC appears well suited for pursuing common European concerns while respecting legitimate national diversity because it commits Member States to work together in reaching joint goals and performance targets without seeking to homogenize their inherited policy regimes and institutional arrangements. Such capacity for (p. 219 ) reconciling European action with national diversity has become more vital than ever with the recent enlargement of the EU to include ten new Member States, which differ widely both from one another and from the original fifteen in their labour market institutions and social welfare regimes, as well as in their levels of economic development and rates of employment, unemployment, and income poverty. 14 In social policy more specifically, some leading proponents of the OMC have also hailed its potential as a cognitive and normative tool for defining and building consensus around a distinctive 'European' (or perhaps more accurately 'EU') 'Social Model' and policy paradigm based on shared values and objectives. 15 Insofar as the OMC systematically and continuously obliges Member States to pool information, compare themselves to one another, and reassess current policies and programmes in light of their relative performance, it likewise appears to be a promising mechanism for promoting experimental learning and deliberative ; or where there is too much national diversity for harmonization at European level to be a credible option (e.g. employment, social protection). Hence in these areas OMC processes cannot plausibly be regarded as a substitute for binding legislation through the 'classic' Community Method, but should be seen instead as an alternative to inaction. 19 Across an increasing range of policy fields, moreover, 'hard law' directives themselves increasingly tend to incorporate provisions for completion and periodic revision of standard-setting through 'soft law' OMC procedures, as in the regulation of industrial waste or occupational health and safety. Often, too, there is an integral continuity between the legally binding norms embodied in EU framework directives (whether enacted through the 'classic' Community Method of legislation or through the social dialogue procedure) and the 'soft' commitments of the EES guidelines, as in the regulation of part-time work or private pensions. 20 Hence the OMC can be seen as one element in a larger emergent system of experimental governance within the EU that blurs the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' law, including growing reliance on framework directives, comitology, 23 In establishing an action programme to support the Social Inclusion OMC, similarly, the Council and the Parliament highlighted the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion enunciated by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Social Charter. 24 At a deeper level, the Community Method itself can be interpreted along the lines suggested by Paul Magnette and others as a deliberative agendasetting mechanism through which the EU, despite its diversity, provides for public-or other-regarding decisions, where such regard means sufficiently responsive to the demands of Member States (and eventually citizens) to be accepted by them as legitimate. In Magnette's view, the Community Method embodies a constitutional requirement that EU institutions and Member States 'integrate a priori the desiderata of the others and take account of them in the formulation of their own preferences'. 25 One interpretation of the Community Method, favoured by the Commission, is that due regard for the interests of the others produces agreement on something approaching the Rousseauian general interest. 26 But on another reading, preferred by Magnette, the Community Method (or what he terms the 'Community Model') is a form of political cooperation characterized by a mixture rather than a separation of powers among EU institutions and the Member States, in which due regard for the others produces a permanent deliberative disequilibrium. This deliberative disequilibrium excludes selfish outcomes without necessarily producing outcomes that are transcendently publicregarding. 27 On both interpretations, however, deliberative agenda setting sufficiently reassures the Member States, and less immediately (p. 223 ) the citizens, that narrowly self-interested proposals will not be advanced for legislative approval. This reassurance in turn induces the Member States to relax veto powers whose exercise would paralyse decision-making in the EU. The Community Method can thus be seen as the constitutional precondition for the EU as a functioning polity.
Viewed in this way, the EU's emergent system of experimentalist governance, with the OMC at its centre, amounts to a renewal rather than a replacement of the Community Method. And the iterative, reciprocal exploration of the relationship between the Union's objectives and Member State policies through the OMC can be further understood as a new form of pragmatic constitutionalism, in which the meaning of common values (ends) is continuously redefined in light of collective experience with alternative means of pursuing them. 28 
C. Democracy
A third critical question about the OMC concerns its democratic character. Is the OMC part of the solution to the EU's democratic deficit or instead part of the problem? OMC processes, objectives, guidelines, and recommendations are formally authorized by Member State governments in the European Council and the sectoral formations of the Council of Ministers, and might thus be considered democratically legitimate from a narrowly intergovernmentalist perspective. 29 But most of the actual work of running OMC processes is done by unelected committees of national civil servants and Commission officials, whose decisions are rarely overturned or even discussed in the Council. The European Parliament has no direct decision-making or oversight role in OMC processes (though it does have a right to be consulted about the employment guidelines), while national parliaments are hardly involved in the preparation of National Action Plans even if they are formally consulted or informed in some Member States. 30 Many proposals for increasing the OMC's legitimacy have focused on enhancing the role of the European and national parliaments in the process. But greater parliamentary involvement per se can hardly be regarded as a panacea, since there is already a substantial democratic deficit in this regard at the national level, where (p. 224 ) legislatures have long experienced grave difficulties in exercising detailed control over policy-making and administration in complex, specialized fields such as employment and social protection. 31 Hence the OMC's democratic legitimacy must rest on an alternative basis: openness, transparency, and broad participation in public problem-solving activities, aimed at promoting mutual learning through coordinated monitoring of decentralized experimentation in pursuit of common goals. Of crucial importance here is broad participation in all phases of OMC processes not only by national administrations and the traditional social partner organizations representing business and labour, but also by other non-state and subnational actors with relevant interests and expertise, notably non-governmental organizations (NGOs) civil society organizations and local/regional authorities. Not only the legitimacy but also the effectiveness of OMC processes, on this view, depend on the participation of the widest possible range of stakeholders in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation at all levels (EU, national, subnational) in order to ensure the representation of diverse perspectives, tap the benefits of local knowledge, and hold public officials accountable for carrying out mutually agreed commitments. Transparency is no less vital, both as a procedural safeguard for European citizens' right to know the reasons behind public decision-making, and as a source of reliable information on which actors at different levels can draw to drive the policy coordination process forward.
Pushed to their logical conclusion, the application of these principles could transform the EU into a new form of pragmatist democracy, in which by directly engaging local administrative units and civil society actors as well as Member States in joint problem-solving through routine comparison of different practices, the Union deliberately raises and helps address doubts about apparently common-sense solutions and the meaning of fundamental values. 32 Both the European and national parliaments, on this view, could valuably participate in framing and debating OMC objectives and procedures, monitoring progress toward agreed goals, and revising the process in light of the results achieved. But this would involve a transformation of the conventional conception of parliaments' role in democratic polities as authoritative principals delegating detailed implementation of legislation to administrative agents, whose behaviour they seek to control through a combination of ex ante incentives and ex post sanctions. Effective participation by parliaments in OMC processes (as in the working of pragmatist or experimentalist democracies more generally) would require them to develop new roles in passing framework legislation embodying commitments to broad goals (like OMC objectives); establishing administrative infrastructures to stimulate decentralized experimentation about how best to achieve these goals, monitor the efforts of local units to improve their (p. 225 ) performance against them, pool the have vigorously campaigned for the right to participate at both European and national levels, achieving significant advances in a number of countries. The Commission and the Parliament have actively supported these demands, especially those of the local and regional authorities, by pressing for changes to the Employment Guidelines and sponsoring innovative projects such as Local and Regional Action Plans (LAPs and RAPS), the development of territorially disaggregated indicators, and the creation of a European local development network and forum for information-sharing and exchange of good practices. 36 A theoretically promising response to the limitations on transparency and participation in existing OMC processes would be to apply to their own procedures the key elements of the method itself: benchmarking, peer review, monitoring, evaluation, and iterative redesign. Thus for example Member States could be required to benchmark openness and participation within all OMC processes according to national laws, traditions, and practices, with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity. 37 The relative success of the Social Inclusion process in 'mobilizing all relevant bodies' testifies to the practical validity of this approach. approach is fully incorporated into its proposals for a new OMC process in health and elder care. 42 
Is OMC Effective? Ambiguities and Empirical Assessment
Perhaps the most widespread criticism of the OMC concerns not its weak democratic legitimacy or potentially pernicious effects, but rather its alleged lack of substantive impact on the Member States. According to this view, the OMC in its present form amounts to little more than the European emperor's newest clothes, an exercise in symbolic politics where national governments repackage existing policies to demonstrate their apparent compliance with EU objectives. 43 Despite the high political stakes involved, the debate surrounding the OMC is widely agreed to suffer from an empirical deficit. Many assessments of the OMC, including some that claim to conduct an 'in context' rather than 'in vitro' analysis of the method, 44 rely in practice on a very limited range of often outdated evidence, onto which they project their own theoretical and normative assumptions. Empirical analysis of the OMC is extremely challenging, for a series of interrelated reasons:
• Despite these practical and methodological problems, there is now a very large body of material available on the empirical operation of OMC processes, particularly in the fields of employment and social policy. Such material includes not only numerous official reviews and reports, 47 but also a wide range of studies and assessments produced by European social partner organizations, NGOs, local and regional authority networks, EU agencies, think-tanks, academic research projects, and individual scholars. 48 The remainder of this section summarizes the conclusions (p. 229 ) of a comparative research project on the European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies conducted by an international team of scholars, which focuses particularly on their operation and influence at national and subnational levels. 49 A. Substantive Policy Change
Among the most widely attested findings of recent empirical work on the European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, both within and beyond our project, is that these OMC processes have raised the political salience and ambitions of employment and social inclusion policies at the national as well as the EU level. A second broadly supported finding is that these OMC processes have contributed to broad shifts in national policy orientation and thinking, involving the incorporation of EU concepts and categories into domestic debates. The most obvious examples of this cognitive influence of OMC on domestic policy orientations concern the shift of emphasis from reducing unemployment to raising employment rates as a core objective, from passive income support to activation services, and from a curative to a preventative approach to fighting unemployment. But many other key concepts associated with the EES and the Social Inclusion process have also entered or gained new prominence on the policy agendas of EU Member States, notably active ageing/avoiding early retirement, lifelong learning, gender mainstreaming, flexicurity (balancing flexibility with security), reconciling work and family life, an inclusive labour market, social exclusion as a multidimensional phenomenon beyond income poverty, and an integrated partnership approach to promoting employment, inclusion, and local development. 50 Beyond these broad shifts in national policy thinking, there is also some evidence that these OMC processes have contributed to specific changes in individual Member States' policies. Such evidence is most abundant for the EES, which has been running considerably longer (seven rounds of NAPs and Joint Reports as against two for the Social Inclusion process), and has been subjected to more extensive research and evaluation. The most salient areas of influence on national policies concern the adoption of individual activation plans and a preventative approach to fighting unemployment, measures to close off pathways to early retirement and encourage lifelong learning, and the promotion of equal gender opportunities and (p. 230 ) gender mainstreaming, including efforts to reduce occupational segregation and pay gaps between men and women. 51 Both in the case of broad cognitive shifts and of specific programmatic changes, however, identifying the precise causal impact of the EES and the Social Inclusion process on national policy-making raises difficult problems of interpretation. Thus changes in Member States' policy orientations, including enhanced attention to employment promotion and social inclusion, often preceded the launch of these OMC processes. In important respects, moreover, these OMC processes cannot be considered truly external to national policy-making, since Member States actively supported their initiation and continuously participate in the definition of objectives, guidelines, and indicators, into which they often seek to 'upload' their own domestic priorities and preferences. Not only have EU Member States actively participated in defining OMC goals and metrics, but they have also exercised considerable selectivity (both conscious and unconscious) in 'downloading' and inflecting European concepts and policy approaches in the fields of employment and social inclusion, as for example in the case of activation. 52 Interpretation of the OMC's substantive policy impact is further complicated by the strategic behaviour of national governments in communicating with domestic publics on the one hand and EU institutions on the other. 53 Thus governments often use references to OMC processes as a source of legitimation and blame-sharing in order to advance their own domestic agenda, sometimes irrespective of their real influence on policy decisions. Conversely, governments may also consciously play down the influence of OMC processes in communicating with domestic audiences, especially in Member States or policy areas where the legitimacy of EU intervention is weak. Governments may likewise deliberately over-or understate the influence of OMC processes on domestic policy in reporting to the EU, depending on whether they want to burnish their credentials as 'good Europeans' by demonstrating con-summate compliance with guidelines and recommendations, or instead to present themselves as defenders of subsidiarity and the national interest against Brussels.
(p. 231 ) Hence both on substantive and methodological grounds, the relationship between OMC processes and Member State policies should be analysed as a two-way interaction rather than a one-way causal impact. The EES and the Social Inclusion process often operate as catalysts or 'selective amplifiers' 54 for national reform strategies, increasing the salience and urgency of particular issues and policy approaches, which may already have been familiar domestically, at least in certain quarters. But there is also hard evidence of the OMC's ability to challenge and expand the terms of national policy debate, especially in fields like gender equality and social inclusion. 55 Yet given the ongoing variations in national interpretation and implementation of European concepts and policy approaches, OMC processes in employment and social inclusion should be viewed less as mechanisms for producing 'cognitive harmonization' 56 than as means for the creation of a common language and categorical framework to discuss and evaluate different solutions to similar problems.
B. Procedural Shifts in Governance and Policy-Making Arrangements
More profound and more easily traceable than the OMC's influence on substantive policy changes within EU Member States has been its contribution to shifts in governance and policy-making arrangements, including administrative reorganization and institutional capacity-building, though here too there are many other causal factors. Nearly all accounts of OMC processes in action at a national level report that they have stimulated improvements in horizontal or crosssectoral integration across formally separate but practically interdependent policy fields: labour market policy, unemployment benefits, social assistance, pensions, taxation, education/ training, and local development in the case of the EES; housing, healthcare, justice, sport/leisure, and transport as well as the above in the case of social inclusion. A second major effect of the OMC has been to stimulate improvements in national statistical and steering capacities. well as to harmonize national and European statistics. A third important influence of the EES and the Social Inclusion process has been to encourage the reinforcement of arrangements for vertical coordination among levels of governance. Such coordination has become both increasingly necessary and increasingly challenging as a result of the widespread decentralization of the (p. 232 ) public employment services and the devolution of welfare and employment policies in federal or federalizing polities. Sometimes this vertical coordination occurs through well-established institutional channels, while in others the NAP preparation process has led to the creation of new formal or informal mechanisms for cooperation and consultation between federal, regional, and in certain cases also local governments. 57 
C. Mutual Learning
Perhaps the most critical claim for the novelty of the OMC concerns its capacity to promote mutual learning among EU Member States. As in the case of substantive policy change, the strongest impact of the European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies in this area has come through a series of indirect or higher-order effects, which are not always recognized as 'learning'. Thus both OMC processes, as Ferrera and Sacchi suggest, have stimulated cross-national learning through heuristic, capacity-building, and maieutic effects. 58 In heuristic terms, as we have already seen, the EES and the Social Inclusion process have been rather successful in identifying common European challenges and promising policy approaches, which have in turn contributed to broad shifts in national policy thinking. Both OMC processes have likewise enhanced mutual awareness of policies, practices, and problems in other Member States, even if such knowledge has largely been concentrated in EU committees and the higher echelons of national administrations. Beyond the formal framework of the OMC itself, moreover, EU Member States show increasing interest in learning from one another in preparing their own domestic policy reforms. 59 In terms of capacity-building, both the EES and the Social Inclusion process have given rise to the development of common European indicators and the creation of new data sources, such as the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Despite continuing data limitations, moreover, they have also contributed to revisions and improvements in national social and employment statistics. In so doing, these OMC processes have stimulated cross-national debate and deliberation about the comparability, 61 In some cases, such reflexive learning has involved making new connections between hitherto separate policy issues, such as pensions and lifelong learning or women's employment and childcare provision. In others, it has entailed recognizing that policies which seemed beneficial from one perspective can be harmful from another, such as early retirement as a palliative for unemployment created by industrial restructuring or high female employment in public social services as a source of occupational segregation and gender pay gaps.
At the same time, however, there are relatively few concrete cases at national level of direct or first-order policy learning from abroad about what works and what does not. Most of the examples of such direct learning cited in interviews and evaluation reports tend to focus on gender mainstreaming, the provision of personalized activation services, and the shift from a curative to a preventative approach to fighting unemployment. 62 Other examples of national policy learning tend to involve more problem recognition than adoption of foreign 'best practice' solutions, as for example with lifelong learning, gender segregation, and labour market integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Even where national policy-makers refer explicitly to other countries' practices and the influence of OMC processes, they typically borrow selectively and adapt foreign programmes to the peculiarities of their own domestic social, institutional, and political contexts. 63 Such contextualized benchmarking as a mechanism for reflexive learning from others also fits well with the findings of comparative-historical research, which shows that foreign practices, whether in the economic or the political field, can rarely be successfully transferred from one social and institutional context to another without significant modification. 64 The need for such contextualization is explicitly recognized in OMC mutual learning programmes, which emphasize in situ explanation of 'good practices' by host country experts on the one hand and creative adaptation to different local conditions by visiting participants on the other. 65 More problematic, however, is the limited evidence of reflexive learning from the results of OMC processes at EU level. According to the Commission's own analysis of the national Impact Evaluation reports, the EES did not do an especially good job during its first five years in identifying which types of active labour market policies or tax-benefit reforms were most effective under what circumstances, and revising the guidelines accordingly, despite all the political attention devoted to these issues, although the exercise itself generated a great deal of empirical material which could be used for that purpose. 66 Nor does the new EES agreed in 2003 fully incorporate the empirical findings of the Impact Evaluation in this regard, even if they do respond to the widely expressed demands of Member State governments and other participating actors for fewer, simpler, and more outcome-oriented guidelines. 67 Even more strikingly, the Member States do not seem to have made much tangible progress in drawing on cross-national learning at the level of local practice about how best to integrate labour market activation with social inclusion, balance flexibility with security, or extend the scope of lifelong learning to a wider section (p. 235 ) of the population. 68 The potential for such 'bottom-up' and 'horizontal' learning from local and regional experimentation is amply illustrated by reports of European networking conferences and innovative local employment projects mentioned earlier. 69 By stimulating the mobilization of non-state and subnational actors, moreover, the EES, and still more the Social Inclusion process, appear to be creating the conditions for such 'bottom-up' learning in many EU Member States even where national governments do not formally acknowledge this in their NAPs or Impact Evaluation reports.
What accounts for these limitations on mutual learning within OMC processes? Part of the problem stems from the ambivalent commitment to this objective on the part of the key actors themselves. Thus the failure to capitalize at a European level on opportunities for reflexive learning from practical experience with the implementation of activation and prevention policies reflects the primary focus within the Commission and EMCO on ensuring national compliance with the action targets in the guidelines, rather than on reviewing the recommended measures in light of accumulated evidence about their effectiveness. And the failure to take full account of the empirical findings of the Five-Year Evaluation in the redesign of the EES likewise reflects the predominance of political bargaining over the new guidelines between the Commission and the Member States, even if the negotiations within EMCO also appear to have been subject to a certain deliberative discipline. 70 Other limitations on mutual learning, however, stem from more readily corrigible defects in OMC procedures and instruments. Thus, for example, there is broad agreement that the increasingly full agendas of EMCO and the SPC on the one hand and the very tight timetable for peer review of the NAPs on the other have crowded out opportunities for mutual learning among the participants. Although the EES peer review programme for the exchange of good practices is generally considered to have been more satisfactory, widespread criticisms have also been raised about its 'show and tell' character, whereby Member States nominate 'poster child' programmes, which are then selected through a 'beauty contest' for presentation to a restricted audience of national officials and experts from those countries that choose to participate. 71 These criticisms have been taken to heart by the members of EMCO and the SPC themselves, who have redesigned their peer review procedures and introduced new programmes to strengthen mutual learning, such as (p. 236 ) thematic review seminars and national follow-up activities open to a broader group of stakeholders, including social partners, independent policy experts, and possibly also local authorities and NGOs. 72 Another set of procedural limitations concern the indicators which are supposed to serve as crucial performance metrics within OMC processes, though here too many of the problems are widely recognized by the EU committees responsible for their administration, and corrective measures are already under way. 73 A final set of procedural limitations on mutual learning within OMC processes concerns the barriers to participation and integration into domestic policymaking discussed in the previous section. Thus the paucity of 'bottomup' cross-national learning within the EES identified by both the FiveYear Evaluation and the contriibutors to our comparative study is closely linked to the limited opportunities for participation by non-state and subnational actors in the process at all stages, from the definition of objectives, guidelines, and indicators, through the preparation, monitoring, and evaluation of the NAPs to the peer reviews and exchange of good practices. And the limited integration of both OMC processes into domestic policy-making, as we have likewise seen, inhibits the broad participation and public debate that is a necessary condition for experimental learning from local practice. Hence the best way to overcome these limitations, as argued earlier, would be reflexively to apply to the OMC's own procedures key elements of the method itself, such as benchmarking, peer review, monitoring, evaluation, and iterative redesign. Thus Member States could be required to benchmark, monitor, and review not only openness and participation within OMC processes, but also their mainstreaming and integration into domestic policy-making according to national laws, traditions, and practices, with full respect for the principle of subsidiarity.
And as in the case of participation, social inclusion offers a partial model for the mainstreaming of OMC processes into domestic policy-making, whose extension to the EES and social protection more generally remains a live and contested issue on the EU agenda. 74 4. The Convention and Social Europe: New Compromise or Anti-Climax?
The Convention on the Future of Europe might have taken stock of the ongoing changes in the Community Method and incorporated the new compromise of experimentalist governance into the constitution of Europe. It might also have (p. 237 ) helped to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of experimentalist governance processes like the OMC by imposing procedural requirements for transparency and broad participation. In practice, it did neither. The achievement of the Convention was to have avoided any recourse to traditional forms of constitutionalism that might have fundamentally obstructed the innovations in EU governance. The Convention's failure was its inability to give due constitutional form to these innovations.
The debate over Social Europe at the Convention quickly stalemated in a way that reflected the limits of the traditional agendas of right and left in the EU. The right tried to keep Social Europe off the agenda altogether, while resisting any increase in the Union's social competences and powers. The left pressed for its historic goal of a single Social Europe, based on parity of the EU's social and economic objectives, together with extension of ( 11 ) Initially, these OMC processes also followed different timetables, with an annual cycle for the BEPG and EES, a biennial cycle for social inclusion, and a triennial cycle for pensions. But the EES and the BEPG have now been 'streamlined' and synchronized with one another on a triennial cycle, with guidelines fixed in the first year, followed by annual updates and implementation reports in years two and three. 
